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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--PROBATION-EXCLUSIONARY RULE IS
INAPPLICABLE TO PROBATION REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS; REQUIRING
DISTRICT COURTS TO GRANT POSTPONEMENT OR USE IMMUNITY FOR
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED PRIOR TO STATE COURT
TRIAL OF THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL CHARGES IS AN INAPPROPRIATE
EXERCISE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S SUPERVISORY POWER
United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826 (1983)
On March 5, 1976, Primo Mollica was convicted of various federal
gambling offenses,I and sentenced to a five-year term of probation beginning
on March 11, 1976.2 Thereafter, on February 19, 1981, Pittsburgh police
1. United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 827 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert.
dented, 104 S. Ct 1439 (1984). These violations included conducting an illegal gam-
bling business, conspiracy to obstruct law enforcement with intent to facilitate an
illegal gambling business, and involvement in prohibited racketeering activities. 712
F.2d at 827-28. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1955, 1511, 1961-1963 (1982). Mollica pleaded
guilty to these charges. Id.
2. 712 F.2d at 828. Originally, Mollica was sentenced to five years imprison-
ment and fined $15,000 for these violations. Id. However, Mollica's prison sentence
was suspended and he was placed on a five-year term of probation pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3651. Id. Section 3651 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable
by death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses
against the United States, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby,
may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defend-
ant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems best.
Upon entering a judgement of conviction of any offense not punishable
by death or life imprisonment, if the maximum punishment provided for
such offense is more than six months, any court having jurisdiction to try
offenses against the United States, when satisfied that the ends of justice
and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served
thereby, may impose a sentence in excess of six months and provide that the
defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a treatment institution for
a period not exceeding six months and that the execution of the remainder
of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
Probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. If an offense is punishable by both fine and impris-
onment, the court may impose a fine and place the defendant on probation
as to imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one or more counts or
indictments, but, in the absence of express limitation, shall extend to the
entire sentence and judgment.
The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may
change the period of probation.
The period of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall not
exceed five years.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
Mollica's probation carried with it the following conditions: 1) that he refrain
(954)
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arrested Mollica and charged him with operation of a lottery,3 bookmak-
ing,4 and conspiracy, 5 in violation of Pennsylvania law. On April 27, 1981,
federal probation officials petitioned the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania to revoke Mollica's probation, alleging that
Mollica had violated Pennsylvania law and thereby breached the conditions
of his probation. 6 The district court scheduled a hearing for May 8, 1981,
two days before Mollica's federal probation was to end.
7
Mollica requested that the district court postpone the probation revoca-
tion proceedings until after the disposition of the state charges against him,8
or in the alternative grant use immunity for his testimony at the revocation
proceedings. 9 After the district court denied both of these requests,' 0 Mol-
from violating any federal, state or local law and 2) that he notify his probation
officer immediately of any change in his residence. 712 F.2d at 828.
3. 712 F.2d at 828. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5512(b) (Purdon 1973). Sec-
tion 5512(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree if he:
(1) sets up, or maintains, any lottery or numbers game;
(2) manufactures or prints, or sells, exposes for sale or has in his pos-
session with intent to sell any unlawful lottery or numbers ticket
or share, or any writing, token or other device purporting or in-
tending to entitle the holder or bearer, or any other person, to any
prize drawn or obtained in any lottery, or numbers game; or
(3) publishes any advertisement of any lottery or numbers game.
Id.
4. 712 F.2d at 828. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5514 (Purdon 1973). Section
5514 provides in pertinent part as follows: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the first degree if he: (1) engaged in pool selling or bookmaking . . . ." Id.
5. 712 F.2d at 828. See 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 903 (Purdon 1983).
6. 712 F.2d at 828. The petition was filed approximately two weeks before Mol-
lica's probation was to expire. Id.
The petition alleged that Mollica had violated his probation by breaking state
law and also by failing to notify his probation officer immediately of a change of his
residence. Id. This latter charge was dismissed by the district court. Id. at n. 1.
7. 712 F.2d at 828. Mollica's five-year probation period from the 1976 federal
conviction ran from May 11, 1976 to May 10, 1981. Id.
8. 712 F.2d at 828. Mollica sought to postpone the probation revocation pro-
ceeding because he feared that if the state charges were not resolved first, his testi-
mony at the revocation proceeding could be used against him in the criminal
prosecution. Id. at 841 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
9. Id. at 828. Mollica requested use immunity so that he might testify in his own
behalf as to the pending Pennsylvania charges at the revocation hearing without the
risk of providing incriminating evidence which could be used against him by the state
at trial. Id. at 836. For a discussion of use immunity, see notes 47, 50 & 51 and
accompanying text infra.
10. 712 F.2d at 828. The district court refused to delay the revocation proceed-
ing because of its concern that it would lose subject matter jurisdiction over Mollica
if proceedings were not commenced before the end of his five year probation term.
Id. The May 8, 1981, request for postponement was made only two days before Mol-
lica's probation was scheduled to expire. Id. Hence the district court believed that it
would not have authority to reconvene after disposition of the state charges. See id.
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of this jurisdictional issue, see note
88 and accompanying text infra.
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lica chose not to testify at the revocation hearing. ' ' The district court also
denied Mollica's motion to suppress evidence seized by the Pittsburgh police
pursuant to an allegedly invalid search warrant, holding that the exclusion-
ary rule did not apply to the probation revocation proceedings. 12 On May
18, 1981, the district court found that Mollica had violated Pennsylvania
law, revoked his probation, and imposed a five-year jail sentence."3 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 14 affirmed in a rehear-
ing en banc, holdng that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable to probation
revocation hearings. A proposed supervisory rule to protect probationers
facing probation revocation hearings based on pending criminal charges by
requiring a grant of postponement or use immunity failed to gain the ap-
proval of a majority of the court.' 5 Although nine members of the court
would have voted to remand the case, their inability to agree on the grounds
11. 712 F.2d at 841 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
12. 712 F.2d at 828. In February, 1981, Mollica had been arrested by Pitts-
burgh police at the residence of Donna Stagno. Id. A detective told the district court
that he had obtained a search warrant for Stagno's residence after an unidentified
informant told him that Mollica was conducting a telephone gambling business
there. Id. After apprehending Mollica and Stagno, three officers searched the Stagno
residence and found the following evidence: two telephones in one room, numerous
sheets of paper, adding machine tapes containing numbers and names of college and
professional basketball teams, a paper with the name and telephone number of Mol-
lica's probation officer, and $17,000 in cash in a locked desk drawer. Id. The district
court did not make a determination of whether the search warrant was valid, finding
the exclusionary rule inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings. Id. For a
discussion of the exclusionary rule's applicability to probation revocation hearings,
see notes 20-26 and accompanying text thfra.
The district court also denied Mollica's request to have use immunity granted to
two defense witnesses, Donna Stagno and Jerry Fimmano, who had resided in the
Stagno residence in early 1981. 712 F.2d at 828. For a discussion of defense witness
immunity, see note 50 and accompanying text tnfra.
13. 712 F.2d at 828. The district court found that Mollica had violated the
Pennsylvania lottery and bookmaking statute, thus violating one of the conditions of
his probation. Id For a discussion of the conditions of Mollica's probation see note 2
supra. The five-year term of imprisonment was the maximum sentence the court
could have imposed at the time of the 1976 conviction. 712 F.2d at 828.
Upon revocation of probation, the district court may imjose any sentence it
might originally have imposed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1982). Section 3653 provides
in pertinent part as follows:
[T]he probationer shall be taken before the court for the district having
jurisdiction over him. Thereupon the court may revoke the probation and
require him to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence, and, if
imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence which
might originally have been imposed.
Id.
14. 712 F.2d at 830. The case was decided in a rehearing en banc before Chief
Judge Seitz and Circuit Judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons, Hunter, Weis, Garth, Hig-
ginbotham, Sloviter, and Becker. Judge Garth wrote the opinion of the court on the
exclusionary rule issue. Judge Gibbons, joined by Judge Aldisert, and Judge Sloviter
filed dissenting opinions on this issue. Judge Higginbotham, without filing an opin-
ion, also indicated his dissent from the court's holding. See id. at 829 & nn.2-4.
15. Id. at 829 & nn.2-4. For a discussion of the supervisory rule proposed by
Judge Garth, see notes 92-95 and accompanying text tfra.
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for remand resulted in an affirmance of the order of the district court.' 6
Um'ted Slates v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1983).
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use in a criminal proceeding of any
evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth, fifth, or sixth
amendment rights. 17 The exclusionary rule is a judicial doctrine designed to
deter official misconduct by prohibiting the government's use of illegally ob-
tained evidence.18 The rule has never been regarded as co-extensive with
the guarantees of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments, and has been flexi-
bly applied by the Supreme Court.' 9
16. 712 F.2d at 829 & nn.2-4. The Third Circuit, having determined that the
district court did not err in its rulings as to five of the issues raised by Mollica, and
having no majority to reverse the district court on its ruling denying postponement or
use immunity, affirmed. Id. at 830. For a discussion of the division of the court on
the supervisory rule, see note 70 and accompanying text zhfra.
On July 20, 1983, Mollica's petition for rehearing was denied. 712 F.2d at 853.
Judge Adams filed a statement in favor of granting a rehearing in which Judges
Hunter and Becker joined. 712 F.2d at 854 (Adams, J., Statement Sur Petition for
Rehearing). Judge Weis also would have granted the petition for rehearing. 712
F.2d at 854 (Weis, J., Statement Sur Petition for Rehearing).
17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). See Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (adopting exclusionary rule in federal court sys-
tem). In 1961, the Supreme Court made the rule applicable to the states as well.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), noted in Note, 7 VILL. L. REV. 130 (1961).
18. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). Originally, the Supreme
Court's rationale for the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases was twofold:
the preservation of judicial integrity and the deterrence of future illegal police behav-
ior. Id at 660. Judicial integrity is said to be impugned when the courts become
party to constitutional violations by permitting the use of wrongfully admitted evi-
dence. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). The rule was also
adopted to deter official disregard of constitutional rights, in the belief that officers
will be deterred from using illegal means to obtain evidence if such evidence may not
be employed later to secure a conviction. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
Since Mapp, the Supreme Court has emphasized the goal of deterrence in exclusion-
ary rule cases. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("the rule's
prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct").
19. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). In Calandra, the
Court characterized the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. See United States v.
Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) ("the Fourth Amendment 'has never been inter-
preted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidences in all proceedings or
against all persons' " (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))). In other
words, the exclusionary rule is not co-extensive with the Fourth Amendment guaran-
tee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
In Leon, the Supreme Court had to decide whether evidence seized in reliance on
a search warrant which was subsequently held invalid was admissible in a criminal
trial. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3412-13. After discussing the various limitations on the
scope of the exclusionary rule, the Court created a "good faith exception" in which it
authorized the admission of "reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably
relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate" even if the war-
rant is later found to be invalid. Id. at 3416.
The Supreme Court has also held that police action based on a presumptively
1983-84]
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In United States v. Calandra,20 the Supreme Court refused to expand the
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. 2' In Calandra, the Court indi-
cated that it would apply a balancing analysis in ruling on proposals for
expansion of the exclusionary rule beyond the criminal trial context.
2 2
Under this analysis, the Court weighs the cost of losing potentially reliable
evidence in the particular proceedings against the increased deterrent effect
which expansion of the rule would have.2 3 In practice, this balancing analy-
sis has generally led the Court to decline to expand the rule to new con-
texts. 24 The Supreme Court 2 5 and six of the seven courts of appeals which
valid statute does not fall within the boundaries of the exclusionary rule. See Michi-
gan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). The effect of the rule has also been limited
when it can be shown that the admission of evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
manner was not prejudicial to the defendant's interests. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85 (1963).
20. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
21. Id. at 342. Calandra's place of business was searched by federal agents
under a warrant issued in connection with a gambling investigation. Id. at 340. Al-
though no gambling paraphernalia were found, one agent discovered evidence which
seemingly related to criminal loansharking activity. Id. at 340-41. Calandra was sub-
poenaed by a grand jury investigating loansharking activity. Id. at 341. Calandra
moved to have the evidence suppressed on the grounds that the search exceeded the
scope of the warrant. Id
22. Id. at 349-51. The Court stated: "In deciding whether to extend the exclu-
sionary rule to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential injury to the
historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule
as applied in this context." Id. at 349,
23. Id. at 349. In applying the balancing test to grand jury proceedings, the
Court found that the potential injury to the functions of the proceeding far out-
weighed the potential benefits of the proposed extension of the exclusionary rule. Id.
at 349-52. The Court first characterized the grand jury's duties as including "both
the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been com-
mitted and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions." Id.
at 343 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972)). Because the grand
jury proceeding is not an adversarial adjudication of guilt or innocence, the Court
reasoned, the procedural and evidentiary rules governing criminal trials are not ap-
plicable. Id. at 349. The Court found that extending the exclusionary rule to grand
jury proceedings would cause delay as well as protracted litigation on collateral is-
sues. Id. at 349-50. The Court stated: "We believe that allowing a grand jury wit-
ness to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the effective and
expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties." Id. at 350. This substantial inter-
ference with the grand jury's function was balanced against the uncertain effect
which applying the exclusionary rule would have in deterring police misconduct. Id.
at 351. The Court found it "unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to
grand jury proceedings would significantly further that goal [of deterrence]" because
"such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed toward
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation." Id.
24. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (the exclusionary rule does
not preclude one sovereign from offering evidence illegally seized by law enforcement
agents of another sovereign in a civil proceeding). In Janis, state agents seized cash
and records pursuant to an invalid search warrant. Id. at 434-39. The evidence was
deemed inadmissible against Janis in the state criminal proceeding, but the IRS was
allowed to use the evidence against him in a subsequent civil action. Id Applying its
Calandra balancing test, the Court found that "the additional marginal deterrence
provided by forbidding a different sovereign from using the evidence in a civil pro-
[Vol. 29: p. 954
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have addressed the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be applied
to probation revocation proceedings 26 have answered this question in the
ceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to that
situation." Id. at 453-54.
The rule has also been found inapplicable to federal habeas corpus proceedings
where the state has heard the fourth amendment claim. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). In Stone, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds that evidence obtained through
unconstitutional means was introduced at his trial if the state provided an opportu-
nity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 494. The
Court reached this conclusion by "weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule
against the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims."
Id. at 489. The costs of applying the rule were the exclusion of reliable and probative
evidence, a shift in focus from the central issues of the case, and the potential break-
down in the morale of the police as a result of indiscriminate application of the rule.
Id. at 489-91. In addition to concluding that these costs were substantial and imme-
diate, the Court also found that application of the exclusionary rule to federal habeas
corpus review of state convictions was unlikely to enhance its deterrent effect. Id. at
493.
25. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (procedural due process guar-
antees applicable to probationers); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (proce-
dural due process guarantees applicable to parolees). In Mornssey and Gagnon, the
Supreme Court indicated that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to proba-
tion or parole revocation hearings. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87 (exclusionary rule
inappropriate due to "the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of
technical rules of procedure or evidence"); Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 ("process should
be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other mate-
rial that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial"). In establishing the
procedural due process guarantees in the context of probation and parole revocation,
the Gagnon and Mornssey Courts emphasized the necessity of receiving accurate data
concerning the probationer's or parolee's activities while at the same time allowing
for more relaxed procedures than in a trial. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-87; Morrissey,
408 U.S. at 489. Application of the traditional evidentiary trial rules may serve to
exclude evidence which is valuable to a probation revocation determination. N. Co-
HEN &J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 433 (1983). For example,
general rules of evidence require information to be supplied only by persons with
firsthand knowledge of the event; accordingly, hearsay evidence is usually excluded.
Id. However, in revocation hearings, firsthand knowledge is sometimes hard to ac-
quire, and requiring it would significantly alter the nature of the proceedings. Id.
Professors Cohen and Gobert suggest that "[o]ne reason is that revocation hearings
may be held far from the home of those persons most able to provide reliable data."
Id. In response to these considerations, the Mornrssey Court rejected the view that all
formal rules of evidence had to be followed, and instead allowed the parole revoca-
tion tribunal considerable discretion in deciding the order of proof and the evidence
to admit. 408 U.S. at 490. The Gagnon Court extended the Morrissey holding to pro-
bation revocation proceedings. 411 U.S. at 778.
26. See United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(fourth amendment exclusionary rule is inapplicable to probation revocation pro-
ceedings); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975) (minimal deterrent
effect and danger to probation system led court to hold Fourth Amendment does not
require suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceeding); United States v.
Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.) (absent police harassment the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable to probation revocation proceeding), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975);
United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d
817 (7th Cir. 1971) (no added deterrent effect achieved when applying exclusionary
6
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negative.
Probation is an alternative punishment for a criminal conviction in
which the offender is conditionally excused from punishment. 27 The under-
rule to probation revocation proceedings; therefore, rule inapplicable); United States
ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970) (exclusionary rule inappli-
cable to parole revocation proceedings). Only the Fourth Circuit has extended the
rule to probation revocation hearings. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205
(4th Cir. 1978). The Workman court reasoned that because prosecutors frequently use
the revocation proceeding as an alternative to trial on new charges against a proba-
tioner, the same exclusionary rule should apply. Id. at 1210. Further, the court
stated that probationers retain their basic constitutional rights, including the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 1208. Creating another ex-
ception to the rule would reduce its effect as a deterrent to police misconduct. Id
The Fourth Circuit believed that the exclusionary rule is necessary in the probation
context to preserve that aspect of the integrity of the legal system from the taint of
illegally seized evidence. Id. at 1209.
Some commentators suggest adopting the Workman rule in a more limited con-
text, applying the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings only when
there is some special indication that it will be effective in deterring police miscon-
duct. See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 25, at 442-45. Cases involving police
harassment or knowledge of the probationer's status prior to the illegal search would
require special attention. Id. A second suggested category of cases requiring applica-
tion of the rule would be those where the police misconduct is so great that the evi-
dence should not be used. Id. These commentators would also apply the
exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings where coerced confessions were involved.
Id. Those writers who would allow the admission of illegally seized evidence to pro-
bation revocation proceedings generally follow the reasoning of the circuit courts,
finding that the costs outweigh the benefits in that context. See generally Uviller, The
Acqui ition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution." Some Constituttonal Premises and Practices in
Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501 (1982).
27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1982); N. COHEN &J. GOBERT, supra note 25, at
4. The concept of an alternative to penal punishment was first recognized in the
mid- 1800's by John Augustus, "the father of probation," who questioned the retribu-
tive focus of penal policy and volunteered to take responsibility for certain offenders.
Id. at 7. Augustus organized informal prisoner aid societies and children aid societies
similar in practice to modern day probation. ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 21-39 (1977). By 1900 numerous states had adopted proba-
tion laws and established probation offices to fulfill the newly recognized occupation.
Id. at 25-26. National acceptance of probation was encouraged by developments in
the juvenile court movement, beginning in 1899 with the enactment of special laws
for juvenile trials by the states of Illinois, Minnesota, and Colorado. Id. Every state
had some type of probation alternative for juveniles by 1925, although it was not
until 1956 that all the states had laws authorizing probation for adults. Id.
Although most of the states had authorized probation alternatives in the early
1900's, a comparable statute authorizing probation in the federal courts did not ap-
pear until 1925. Id. The issue of whether the federal courts had the authority to grant
probationary sentences came before the Supreme Court in Exparte United States, 242
U.S. 27 (1916). See N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 25, at 8. In Exparte United
States, the Supreme Court held that federal courts had no power to indefinitely sus-
pend a defendant's sentence. 242 U.S. at 50-52. The Court reasoned that such a
suspension was a refusal to enforce the law as mandated by the legislature. 242 U.S.
at 50-53. The Court explicitly recognized the power of the legislative branch to au-
thorize probation by statute. See id. In 1925 the Federal Probation Act was passed
by Congress and officially established the Federal Probation System. See Federal Pro-
bation Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 842 (1925) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(1982)). In 1930 the system underwent two major changes. S. DILLINCHAN & R.
[Vol. 29: p. 954
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lying rationale of probation is that releasing a criminal offender from con-
finement under the supervision of an officer of the court is the most effective
means of rehabilitating him. 28 Once it is determined that the offender's
current conviction is not one for which the federal statute bars probation,
the decision to place the defendant on probation is within the discretion of
the trial judge.29 Probation conditions are of two types: reform conditions,
which are designed to facilitate the offender's rehabilitation, and control
conditions, which are designed to facilitate monitoring the offender's behav-
ior and attitudes. 30 If the probationer breaches the conditions of his proba-
tion he may be sentenced to a prison term, following a judicial revocation
proceeding.
3
1
In establishing procedural due process requirements in the context of
probation revocation proceedings, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
necessity of receiving accurate data concerning the probationer's activities,
and consequently has authorized more relaxed procedures than those re-
quired in a criminal trial. 32 In Morrssey v. Brewer,33 the Supreme Court held
that a parolee's 34 conditional liberty is a protected interest under the due
MONTGOMERY, PROBATION & PAROLE IN PRACTICE 25 (1983). "One change re-
moved the system from the U.S. Civil Service and placed it under the power of the
federal district courts with the power of appointment of probation officers, while the
second change extended supervisory responsibilities for parolees to probation of-
ficers." Id. A later change was the shifting of control of the system from the execu-
tive branch to the judicial branch. See id.
28. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 25, at 8-11. Some commentators feel
that the goal of rehabilitation, the most significant justification for probation, is at
odds with the policies underlying criminal incarceration. See id. Victims may feel
that inadequate retribution has been exacted, and probation conditions may be too
lenient to deter future misconduct. Id. at 10.
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). Section 3651 bars the trial judge from granting
probation to any defendant who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment. Id. A judge may otherwise grant probation where "the ends ofju tice
and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served." Id. Fo' the
text of § 3651, see note 2 supra.
30. N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 25, at 185-89. Examples of reform con-
ditions are conditions restricting access to automobiles, weapons, alcohol and certain
jobs. Id. at 186. Examples of control conditions are requirements that the proba-
tioner obtain his counselor's permission before moving or traveling and submit to
searches and questioning. Id.
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1982). For the text of§ 3653, see note 13 supra.
32. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). For a discussion of Mors se e
notes 33-37 and accompanying text infra.
33. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrtssey the Supreme Court considered the due
process rights of two offenders who had had their parole revoked without a hearing.
See id. Morrissey was convicted of the false drawing of checks in 1967 in Iowa. Id. at
472. He pleaded guilty and was later paroled from the state penitentiary. Id.
Within a year of his release he was arrested as a parole violator and was returned to
prison. Id. at 472-73. Morrissey received no hearing prior to the revocation of his
parole. Id. at 473. The Court held that a state could not revoke parole without a
hearing. Id. at 487-90. For a further discussion of the Aortssey procedural safe-
guards, see note 35 and accompanying text ihfta.
34. See generally N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, supra note 25 at 3-6. Probation and
parole are two distinct forms of correctional supervision. Id. at 3-4. Both grant a
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process clause and that therefore a state could not revoke parole without a
hearing.3 5 Although the Mornrssey Court stressed that this hearing was not to
be regarded as the equivalent of a criminal prosecution,3 6 due process re-
quired that a probationer have an opportunity to speak out in his own be-
status of conditional liberty, the purpose of which is to allow a person convicted of a
crime to live outside a prison facility so long as that person observes certain rules. Id.
In the federal system the court grants probation as part of the sentencing process
upon entering a judgment of conviction. Id Parole is an administrative proceeding
which is within the jurisdiction of the United States Board of Parole. Id. at 4. Parole
can be distinguished from probation in that the offender is conditionally released
after serving part of a prison term. Id. In the sentencing process, the court designates
a definite minimum term for parole eligibility. Id. The offender then serves the
remaining part of his sentence in the community. Id. If a parole condition is
breached, the offender can be returned to prison to serve out the original sentence
after a revocation proceeding. Id. The same due process rights afforded to parolees
in Mornssey have been applied to probationers. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
35. 408 U.S. at 488. The fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the state
and federal governments from depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. Governmental re-
straint or imprisonment of criminal defendants implicates liberty interests protected
by the due process clause. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 528-39 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. Due process
requires that fair procedures accompany any such deprivation of liberty. Id. Even
after a defendant has been convicted and incarcerated through fair procedures, he
retains a liberty interest in remaining free from more burdensome restraints. Id. at
536-39. Similarly, a convicted defendant placed on probation or parole has a liberty
interest in avoiding revocation of his "conditional" liberty. Mornssey, 408 U.S. at 482.
See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (Supreme Court extends to proba-
tioners due process protections equivalent to those afforded parolees in Mornrsey).
In Momssey, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of what process was due in a
revocation hearing. Morrsey, 408 U.S. at 480-89. The Court held that due process
required that a parolee be afforded an opportunity to be heard at a revocation pro-
ceeding to assure informed, intelligent and just decisions based on accurate knowl-
edge of the parolee's behavior. Id. at 484. The Court proposed a two-tiered hearing
procedure. The first tier required a preliminary hearing to determine whether there
were reasonable grounds for revocation. Id. at 485-86. The preliminary hearing had
to be held "at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest
and as promptly as convenient after the arrest while information is fresh and sources
are available." Id. at 485. The hearing must be conducted by an independent of-
ficer, and the parolee is to receive notice of the alleged violations and of the time,
location, and purpose of the hearing. Id. at 486-87. The parolee also has the right to
appear and present evidence at the hearing, and a limited right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. Id. at 487. If the decision-maker at the preliminary hearing deter-
mines that there is probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, then the
second tier of the procedure, a final revocation hearing, is required. Id. at 487-88.
The parolee is entitled to the same procedural protections at the final hearing as
those required for the preliminacy hearing. Id.
One year after Mornssey the Court extended the same two-tiered procedural re-
quirements to probation revocation hearings. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973). For a discussion of the evidentiary rules applicable to probation revocation
hearings, see note 25 supra.
36. 408 U.S. at 489. The Mornssey Court stated: "We emphasize [that] there is
no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution
in any sense." Id.
[Vol. 29: p. 954
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half and to present evidence and witnesses in support of his defense.3 7
Conversely, the Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants have the
constitutional right to remain silent in any proceeding where there is a possi-
bility that any answers illicited might incriminate them in a subsequent
criminal proceeding.3
8
It is not uncommon for a probation revocation proceeding based on
pending criminal charges to convene prior to the trial of those charges.39 By
exercising his right to testify and present a defense at the revocation hearing,
the probationer may provide evidence usable against him in the subsequent
criminal trial. 40 This situation raises the question of whether the proba-
37. See Mornssey, 408 U.S. at 489. The Mornssey Court stated that the principal
policy underlying the probationer's right to an opportunity to be heard at a revoca-
tion proceeding is to assure informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions. Id. at
484. This right also includes an opportunity for the probationer to explain any miti-
gating circumstances if there is a determination of a violation of probation. Id. at
488. The state's interest in having a fair revocation proceeding is to make certain
that it is neither interrupting a successful rehabilitation of the probationer nor risking
the safety of the community by letting an unrehabilitated offender go free. Id. at 483-
84. Further, the Court stated that allowing the probationer an opportunity to testify
in his own behalf works to enhance his chance of rehabilitation by treating him with
fairness. Id. at 484. Although the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the
standard of proof required in a probation revocation proceeding, the tone of the
Morrsey decision indicated that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would not be neces-
sary. See id. at 489.
38. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (privilege to remain silent ap-
plies to both civil and criminal proceedings). See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Con-
stitution provides in part that "No person shall .. .be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ." Id. See also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,
40 (1924). There is, however, no violation of a defendant's fifth amendment right not
to "be compelled . . . to be a witness against himself" unless there is some element of
compulsion. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966).
The privilege to remain silent reflects the following important policies: 1) an
unwillingness to subject alleged offenders to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt;" 2) a "preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisito-
rial system of criminal justice;" 3) a "fear that self-incriminating statements will be
elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses;" 4) the desire for a sense of fair play,
demanding a "fair state-individual balance" by requiring the government in its con-
test with the individual to shoulder the entire load; 5) a respect for the privacy of
each individual; and 6) a realization that while the privilege may be a "shelter to the
guilty" it is often "a protection to the innocent." See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 317 (McNaughton Rev., 1961).
39. See Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977
(1979). In Ryan, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
It is not unreasonable for the state to attempt to revoke probation without
first proceeding with a full scale criminal trial on the subsequent offense
.... The efficiency of the probation revocation process may be deemed by
the state to be the best and most effective means for removing a recalcitrant
criminal from society, since it eliminates the far more costly procedure of a
criminal trial for the subsequent offense.
Id. at 993 (citations omitted).
40. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384 (1975). Conversely, by choosing to preserve his right to remain silent at trial by
declining to testify at the revocation hearing, the probationer sacrifices his due pro-
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/14
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tioner's forced election between surrendering either his fifth amendment
right to remain silent at trial or his due process right to present a defense to
probation violation allegations is constitutionally permissible. 4 In AcGaulha
v. California,42 the Supreme Court held that a forced election between consti-
tutional rights is not impermissible unless the choice offends the policies un-
derlying one of the rights involved. 43 In Ryan v. Montana,44 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that there was no constitutional violation in forcing a
probationer to elect between presenting a defense at his probation hearing
and remaining silent to avoid incriminating himself at his subsequent trial.
45
Applying the McGaulha standard, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that there was
cess right to present a defense at the revocation hearing. See id. at 874, 533 P.2d at
1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
41. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (adverse inferences which
could be drawn by a failure to testify did not impose an impermissible penalty on the
exercise of one's fifth amendment right); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)
(requiring defendant who chose to testify on his own behalf to do so at a certain time
in the hearing unconstitutionally infringed upon his right to remain silent); Ryan v.
Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978) (choice to remain silent, thereby risking pro-
bation revocation, was not a deprivation of right to present defense), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 977 (1979); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.) (petitioner was not forced to
make unconstitutional choice between remaining silent at his deferred sentence viola-
tion hearing, or speaking up in his own defense at the risk of self-incrimination in an
upcoming criminal trial based on the same incident because there was no compelled
self-incrimination), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
42. 402 U.S. 183, vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941 (1971).
43. 402 U.S. at 213-20. The McGautha Court rejected the defendant's argument
that Ohio's procedure of having a single trial on the issues of guilt and punishment
presented an intolerable tension between his due process right to address his sen-
tencer, and his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 216-17. The Court found
that a forced election between the two constitutional rights was not impermissible as
the election did not impair, to an appreciable extent, any of the policies behind the
rights involved. Id. at 213-14. The Court identified the policies behind the privilege
against self-incrimination as "varied," and stated that "not all are implicated in any
given application of the privilege." Id. at 214 (citations omitted). Without examin-
ing the policies of the due process right to present a defense, the Court determined
that Ohio's single-verdict trial was unlikely to deter the defendant from bringing to
the jury's attention exculpating evidence. Id. at 220.
In an earlier forced election case the Court held that a defendant's testimony at
a suppression hearing on the issue of standing to object to evidence may not thereaf-
ter be admitted against him on the issue of guilt. See Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 394 (1968). In light of McGautha, the Simmons Court's rejection of forced
election between asserting a constitutional right and retaining the privilege against
self-incrimination appears to be limited to the suppression hearing context. See Mc-
Gautha, 402 U.S. at 211-13.
44. 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979).
45. Id. at 990. Ryan was placed on probation and imposition of sentence was
deferred after a state criminal conviction. Id at 989. After Ryan allegedly violated
the terms of his probation, a revocation hearing was held, at which Ryan refused to
testify for fear of incriminating himself at the subsequent criminal trial. Id. at 990.
The court found that Ryan was not forced to make an unconstitutional election, as
he would be if "by asserting his privilege against self-incrimination [he] forfeited a
powerful and sought-after position, lost the economic benefit of potential future em-
ployment, [or] was deprived of certain associational rights guaranteed by the first
amendment." Id. at 991.
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no injury to the probationer's privilege against self-incrimination since he
was under no compulsion to testify at any point. 46 Although the Ryan court
found no constitutionally impermissible tension between the two competing
rights, it did recognize the desirability of giving greater protection to the
probationer through a grant of use immunity47 to the probationer at the
46. Id. at 990. The policy underlying the fifth amendment privilege is the
avoidance of compelled self-incrimination, the Ninth Circuit emphasized, and the pro-
bationer was not compelled to testify at his probation revocation hearing or at trial.
Id. at 990-92. To substantiate a finding of compulsion, Ryan would have to show
that a sanction of some kind automatically followed from his exercise of the privilege
to remain silent. Id. at 991. The Ninth Circuit found neither a sanction nor a misuse
of the probation revocation process. Id. See also Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (lst
Cir.) (petitioner was not forced to make unconstitutional choice between remaining
silent at his deferred sentence violation hearing or speaking up in his own defense at
the risk of self-incrimination in an upcoming criminal trial based on the same inci-
dent because there was no compelled self-incrimination), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026
(1974).
47. 580 F.2d at 994. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1982). Section 6002 grants
United States courts the authority to order use immunity. Id. § 6002. Section 6002
provides in pertinent part as follows:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee or a subcommittee of
either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testi-
mony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order.
Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the current immunity statute in Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court found that the scope of the use immunity
statute was co-extensive with the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 459. The Court also found that use immunity ade-
quately protects the witness by shifting to the government the burden of affirmatively
proving at any subsequent criminal prosecution that the evidence proposed to be
used is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony. Id. at 460. This additional burden may be costly, and may result in the loss of
evidence (if the burden is not met). See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). The state may be able to satisfy the
additional burden of proof by "freezing" and documenting the Government's evi-
dence prior to the immunization. Id. at 775. However, as noted in Turklsh, this
technique may not work when the Government is involved in a continuing investiga-
tion which discloses vital evidence after the immunization. Id. The Turkish court also
recognized the possibility that the state might deliberately limit itself in its examina-
tion of the defendant to protect its evidence from later claims of immunized testi-
mony. Id.
The Turkish court found that the timing of the immunity request could prove to
be costly for the state. Id. at 777-78. When made in the middle of the trial the state
must shoulder the burden of providing documentation for any subsequent evidence
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revocation proceeding or, in the alternative, through postponement of the
revocation proceedings until after the disposition of the underlying state
charges. 4
8
and its source. Id. at 775 (citing United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976)).
See also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008
(1982). The Thevis court believed that the prosecution might have to take extraordi-
nary measures to protect its evidence, such as arranging for a new team of prosecu-
tors to take over the investigation. Id. at 640 n.26.
Although the statute has traditionally been limited to grants of immunity to
witnesses for the prosecution, several circuits have considered the issue of whether
immunity or defense witnesses is available under the statute. See, e.g., United States
v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.) (court agreed that under certain circumstances
the prosecution's refusal to immunize defense witnesses under the statute could vio-
late due process), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976). The other circuits have adopted
more restrictive approaches. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188 (1st Cir.
1980) (trial court does not have the authority under the statute either to grant immu-
nity to a witness whose testimony the defendant may wish to offer or to force the
prosecution to grant the witness immunity); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769
(2d Cir. 1980) (court faced with claim of defense witness immunity should summarily
reject claims whenever the witness is an actual or potential target of prosecution), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
In contrast, the Third Circuit has adopted an expansive approach toward de-
fense witness immunity. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). In Herman, the Third Circuit established the specific
burden a defendant must meet in order to obtain defense witness immunity under
the statute, and suggested the availability of another form of defense witness immu-
nity derived from the court's inherent power: a grant of judicial use immunity. Id. at
1203-04. In recognizing that a due process violation may require dismissal in certain
circumstances when the prosecutor refuses to statutorially grant immunity, the court
articulated the defendant's burden in order for the court to grant statutory immunity
to a defense witness: "The defendant must be prepared to show that the govern-
ment's decisions were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial
fact finding process." Id. at 1204. In a later case the court reaffirmed the statutory
immunity standard articulated in Herman, and solidified its position on the issue of
judicial grants of immunity for defense witnesses. See Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615
F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981). In Virgin Islands v. Smith, the
court found that it had the inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's compul-
sory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness
whose testimony was essential to the defense. Id. at 969. The court outlined the
requisite conditions for a judicial grant of defense witness immunity: "[I]mmunity
must be properly sought in the district court; the defense witness must be available to
testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be
essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail
against a grant of immunity." Id. at 972.
Judicial immunity differs from statutory immunity in two respects. See id. First,
judicial immunity is necessitated not because of prosecutorial misconduct or inten-
tional distortion of the trial practice, but because the defendant is prevented from
presenting exculpatory evidence vital to his case. See id. Second, the court decrees
immunity rather than issuing an order requiring the prosecution to provide statutory
immunity. See id.
48. 580 F.2d at 994. The Ryan court did not find the alternative of postpone-
ment to be as desirable as a grant of use immunity. Id. The court found that holding
the revocation proceeding prior to the criminal trial was reasonable considering the
potential expense of a delay. Id.
In contrast, the American Bar Association favors postponing revocation hearings
in this situation:
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Those courts which have considered this self-incrimination dilemma
faced by a probationer when revocation hearings are held prior to trial on
the underlying charges have not found it to be unconstitutional. 49 However,
a majority of those states which have addressed the issue have regarded the
choice as involving an "unfair tension" between competing constitutional
rights,50 justifying the adoption of a supervisory rule to require postpone-
A revocation proceeding based solely upon commission of another crime
ordinarily should not be initiated prior to the disposition of that charge.
However, upon a showing of probable cause that another crime has been
committed by the probationer, the probation court should have discretion-
ary authority to detain the probationer without bail pending a determina-
tion of the new criminal charge.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 5.3 (1974). The commentary to this section
explains the rationale of this policy: the probation revocation proceeding is relatively
informal as compared to the trial of the original charge. Id. There is a lesser burden
of proof, a relaxation of the rules of admissibility of evidence, and no jury. Id. Be-
cause the ABA believes that these factors may lead to an abuse of the proceeding, it
recommends that the revocation proceeding be postponed until after the disposition
of the new criminal charges. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.3 (1962) (recom-
mendation that revocation be postponed until after new trial); United States v.
Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 1978) (supervisory rule requiring defendants be
advised of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights before testifying in grand jury proceed-
ing unnecessary in light of Justice Department's adoption of such a practice). Those
courts which have considered the postponement alternative have looked, as did the
Ryan court, at the timeliness of the request as well as the lesser standard of proof
attaching at the revocation proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d
769, 777-78 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). A postponement
of revocation proceedings until after the criminal trial could violate the due process
requirement of Mornrssey that revocation proceedings be held promptly. Id. For a
discussion of the Momrsey requirements, see note 25 and accompanying text supra. In
some instances the prosecution is only interested in having the offender incarcerated
and would have dropped the new charges if revocation had occurred. See N. COHEN
&J. GOBERT, supra note 25, at 481. By holding the criminal trial first the state will
have invested a great deal of time and money. Id. Even if the probationer is found
not guilty at the trial the prosecution may at that time hold the revocation hearing.
Id.
49. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384 (1975). In Coleman, the Supreme Court of California specifically addressed the
dilemma faced by the probationer when his revocation hearing is held prior to his
criminal trial based on the same underlying actions. Id. at 871-72, 533 P.2d at 1030,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 390. After examining the competing rights, the court was " 'unable
to find any basis for saying that the occasional unfairness which results from the
state's ordering of the two proceedings . . . reaches unconstitutional proportions.' "
Id. at 888, 533 P.2d at 1041, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (quoting Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d
100, 104-05 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974)). See also Ryan v. Montana,
580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978) (affirming state court opinion that it is not constitution-
ally impermissible to require strategic choice), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979). Accord
McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673,
370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977).
50. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d at 885, 533 P.2d at 1039, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 399. The Coleman court explained that although there was no constitutional
violation, the situation faced by the probationer occasionally resulted in unfairness.
Id. Thus the court felt justified in imposing a greater standard of protection than
that mandated by the Constitution. Id. at 888, 533 P.2d at 1041, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
401. The court exercised its supervisory powers in fashioning the exclusionary rule
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ment of the revocation hearing until after the disposition of state charges or
a grant of use immunity for testimony at the revocation hearing. 5' The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court, invoking its inherent power to insure the fair admin-
istration ofjustice in the California court system, was the first to adopt such
a rule.
5 2
The federal courts of appeals exercise a generally acknowledged but ill-
defined supervisory power to decide particular cases and impose rules of de-
cision. 53 The source of this power is unstated 54 and its scope is uncertain. 55
which would protect probationers from their own incriminating statements at the
revocation hearing. Id.
51. McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980) (supervisory rule requires
courts to grant parolee use immunity when faced with revocation hearing and subse-
quent criminal trial based on same conduct); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533
P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975) (court adopts supervisory rule granting use
immunity to probationer if revocation hearing held prior to trial on same underlying
charges); State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977) (upon timely objec-
tion at criminal trial, evidence from revocation hearing based on same conduct inad-
missible except for impeachment purposes). But see Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st
Cir.) (court found no constitutional mandate compelling state to address this situa-
tion and did not consider a supervisory rule), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
52. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975). For a discussion of
the Coleman court's resolution of the "forced election" constitutional issue, see note 49
and accompanying text supra. Invoking its supervisory power, the Coleman court
stated that "the testimony of the probationer at a probation revocation hearing held
prior to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of the
conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is inad-
missible against the probationer. . . on the related criminal charges." Id at 889, 533
P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 400. For further discussion of the dilemma faced by a
probationer in these circumstances see notes 39-51 and accompanying text supra.
53. See Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Power by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 27 VILL. L. REV. 506 (1982). Judge Schwartz's work is a comprehensive over-
view of the supervisory power at the intermediate appellate level. Id. "It appears
that supervisory power embraces any decision not based on the Constitution, statutes,
procedural rules, or precedent, including decisions based on policy grounds." Id. at
508.
54. Id. at 513-22. Judge Schwartz seems to conclude that the only real sources
of this supervisory authority are the statutes creating inferior federal courts (an im-
plicit source) and statements by the Supreme Court which assume the existence of
the power without defining its parameters. See id. at 518-25.
Judge Schwartz refers to the Third Circuit's reliance on the "trickle-up" theory
for the exercise of its supervisory power. Id. at 523. Judge Schwartz finds it improper
for a court of appeals to assume that statutory grants of power to district courts carry
with them a related supervisory power vested in the courts of appeals. Id. Instead,
Judge Schwartz finds it more appropriate for an appellate court to define the limit of
the district court's power, while the statutory power remains in the district court. Id.
55. Id. at 513-22. The Supreme Court's statements about the scope and the
foundation of the supervisory power at the appellate level have been uncertain, with
the most recent case simply addressing the areas of appropriate intervention. See id.
at 525. See also United States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983). The Hasting Court
wrote that the purposes underlying use of the supervisory power are threefold: 1) to
implement a remedy for the violation of recognized rights; 2) to preserve judicial
integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly
before the jury; and 3) to deter illegal conduct on the part of law enforcement agents.
Id. at 1978-79.
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Although not constitutionally mandated in particular cases, 56 the exercise of
the judicial supervisory power may serve to: 1) implement a remedy for the
violation of recognized rights; 57 2) preserve judicial integrity by ensuring
that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury,58
and 3) deter illegal conduct on the part of law enforcement agents. 59 A cir-
cuit court's supervisory power is clearly subject to the limitations of binding
precedent and legislative enactments. 60 Further, the doctrines of separation
of powers61 and federalism 62 restrict the freedom of the courts of appeals to
56. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 507 F.2d 963, 970 (3d Cir.)
(Aldisert, J., dissenting) ("[d]eciding a case in the exercise of a court's supervisory
power means little more than ruling on a basis not specifically set forth in the Consti-
tution, or by statute, procedural rule or precedent"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
As supervisory rules are not mandated by the Constitution, before promulgating
them, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that a court must consider the
potential burden on a corollary branch of government and the state. See generally
NOWAK, supra note 35, at 106-09.
57. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (Supreme Court
supervisory power "implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized stan-
dards of procedure and evidence" beyond due process requirements). See also Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1956) (barring testimony of federal agent who
breached procedural requirements which "are designed to protect the privacy of the
citizen").
58. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (confession resulting from
violations of congressionally established procedures held inadmissible under Court's
supervisory power though not mandated by Congress to do so). See also Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-24 (1960) (banning use in federal trials of evidence
illegally seized by state police officers).
59. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980) (legitimate justifi-
cation for use of supervisory power is deterring police misconduct).
60. Schwartz, supra note 53, at 532-34. Judge Schwartz finds the Third Circuit's
handling of federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions consistent with
the limitations set by statute. Id. at 533. As Judge Schwartz explains, the statute
provides relief only when the "prisoner is in custody 'in violation of the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.' " Id. at 533-34 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1)
(1982)). The court has refused to grant release on any other basis. Id at 534. Thus
Judge Schwartz might also view the immunity statute as another limitation on the
court's exercise of its supervisory power, which would preclude the court from a judi-
cial grant of immunity as an exercise of its supervisory power. For a discussion of the
immunity statute and the Third Circuit's interpretation, see note 47 and accompany-
ing text supra.
61. Schwartz, supra note 53, at 530. The separation of powers doctrine provides
for the power of the state to be divided among three branches of government. See
generally NOWAK, supra note 35, at 135-37. Although the Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that the Constitution requires a complete division of authority among
the branches, it has limited the court of appeals' exercise of its supervisory power
whenever the proposed rule imposed a significant burden on a co-equal branch of
government. See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 532 & n.124. Judge Schwartz believes
that exercise of the supervisory power implicates separation of powers when an appel-
late court is faced with misconduct by the executive branch. Schwartz, supra note 53,
at 527-28. The Third Circuit's decision to grant immunity to defense witnesses on a
finding of prosecutorial misconduct falls within this category. For a discussion of
how the Third Circuit has addressed this issue, see note 47 and accompanying text
supra.
62. Schwartz, supra note 53, at 531. Principles of federalism limit a federal
1983-84]
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adopt supervisory rules. 63
The Third Circuit frequently exercises its supervisory power to impose
procedural rules, particularly in the criminal context. 64 One jurist has urged
a reconsideration of the limitations upon the supervisory power in order to
safeguard the legitimacy of its proper exercise.
65
Against this background, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals sat en banc
to review the revocation of Mollica's probation. 66 In a per curiam opinion,
court's power to prescribe procedural rules affecting the states and to make policy
judgments for the states. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) ("We do
not establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitu-
tion"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (absent special circumstances, fed-
eral courts must protect federal rights without "unduly interfer[ing] with the
legitimate activities of the States").
63. See generally Schwartz, supra note 54, at 526-34.
64. See generally Schwartz, supra note 53, at 509-14. Judge Schwartz notes that
the Third Circuit's exercise of its supervisory power in the criminal context has been
more limited in cases involving the executive branch than in those cases involving the
judicial branch. See id. However, Judge Schwartz aptly points out that the Third
Circuit has twice remanded cases to the district court through exercise of its supervi-
sory power over the executive branch. Id. at 509 n. 15 (citing United States v. Serubo,
604 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85
(3rd Cir. 1973)). Judge Schwartz argues that the court's exercise of its supervisory
power in areas concerning the judiciary is more extensive. Id. at 510-11 & n. 17 (citing
United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. Dixon, 504
F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1974)).
65. See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 526-66. Judge Schwartz believes that in order
for the Third Circuit to exercise its supervisory power in a responsible and legitimate
manner, the court must first articulate the limitations on the exercise of its power. Id.
Having determined possible limitations on the exercise of a court of appeals' supervi-
sory power to include 1) the Supreme Court's statements on the issue, 2) the doctrines
of separation of powers and federalism, and 3) statutory provisions, Judge Schwartz
finds that the Third Circuit's exercise of its power has not always conformed with
these limitations. Id. at 526-35. In response to these "abuses," Judge Schwartz recog-
nized a need for a legitimizing mechanism through which the court could consider
whether an exercise of supervisory power was appropriate. Ma. at 564-66. Judge
Schwartz posited several alternative courses of action. The first alternative was to do
nothing and permit the court to exercise its supervisory power whenever it sees fit. Id.
at 565. The second alternative was to preclude the court from any exercise of proce-
dural rulemaking via its supervisory power. Id. The third alternative was to adopt a
mechanism which would limit the court's exercise of its supervisory power while at
the same time allowing the exercise necessary to remedy procedural problems. Id.
Judge Schwartz found the third alternative to be the most desirable. Id. Thus a
court could exercise its supervisory power to amend a procedural rule, but this
"amendment" would only be effective for a limited time. d. at 566. If, after a cer-
tain time period, the rule had not been adopted by the Judicial Council for the Cir-
cuit, the rule would no longer be in effect. d. Judge Schwartz also noted as a
drawback of such a mechanism that certain holdings of a court would, in effect, be
temporary. Id.
66. 712 F.2d 825 (per curiam). Mollica argued on appeal that 1) the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule applies to a probation revocation proceeding; 2) the
district court was powerless to revoke his probation and to reimpose his original
prison sentence when the maximum period of probation allowed had expired at the
time of revocation; 3) the district court erred in not postponing the probation revoca-
tion hearing until after disposition of the underlying state criminal charges or alter-
natively in not granting Mollica use immunity at the revocation hearing; 4) the
970 [Vol. 29: p. 954
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accompanied by five separate opinions, the court affirmed the judgment of
the district court.6 7 A majority of the court held that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings. 68 A
separately-comprised majority of the judges declined to adopt a proposed
supervisory rule which would require district courts to grant postponement
or use immunity to probationers facing revocation proceedings on the basis
of criminal charges prior to the trial of those charges. 69 Although nine
judges would have remanded the case, no one basis for remand could com-
mand a majority. 70
Judge Garth wrote for a majority of the court in explaining the Third
Circuit's refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to probation revocation pro-
ceedings. 7 ' Although he noted that six out of seven courts of appeals had
declined to expand the exclusionary rule in the same circumstances, 72 Judge
district court erred in reinstating his original sentence without revealing its reasons
for doing so; 5) the district court erred in not ordering disclosure of the identity of the
informant whose information led to the search and seizure of the gambling materials;
and 6) the district court erred in refusing to grant immunity to defense witnesses
Stagno and Fimmano. Id. at 829.
67. Id. at 827 (per curiam). The court unanimously held that the district court
did not err in holding that it had power to revoke Mollica's probation, in failing to
state its reasons for the sentence, in not ordering disclosure of the informant's iden-
tity, or in refusing to grant immunity to the defense witnesses. Id. at 829.
68. Id. at 829. Accordingly, the court rejected Mollica's argument that the dis-
trict court had erred in refusing to hold a suppression hearing. See t. Judges Gib-
bons and Aldisert dissented from the ruling on the exclusionary rule in an opinion
written by Judge Gibbons. Id. at 846-47 (Gibbons, J. dissenting). For a discussion of
Judge Gibbons' dissent, see notes 83-86 and accompanying text infra. Judge Sloviter
also dissented on the exclusionary rule issue in a separate opinion. Id. at 849
(Sloviter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
For a discussion of Judge Sloviter's views, see note 87 and accompanying text infra.
Judge Higginbotham dissented from the court's ruling on the exclusionary rule with-
out opinion. See id. at 829 n.4.
69. See id. at 841-46 (Seitz, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 849 (Sloviter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); 1. at 849-
53 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). Judges
Becker and Hunter joined in Judge Adams' opinion. Id. Judge Garth urged the
adoption of the supervisory rule in an opinion in which Judges Gibbons, Aldisert,
and Weis joined. See id. at 835-38 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
and from the judgment). The split of opinion among the judges on the supervisory
rule is discussed at note 70 and accompanying text Mfra.
70. See 712 F.2d at 829 (per curiam). Four judges, Garth, Gibbons, Aldisert and
Weis, would adopt the proposed rule and remand on this basis. Id. & n.2. Three
judges, Adams, Hunter, and Becker, would remand on the grounds that the district
court acted under an erroneous interpretation of the law when it issued a discretion-
ary denial of Mollica's request for postponement. See id. & n.3. See also id. at 849-53
(Adams, J., concurring in part). Fourjudges, Aldisert, Gibbons, Sloviter and Higgin-
botham, would remand for a suppression hearing, as they would rule that the exclu-
sionary rule is applicable to probation revocation proceedings. 712 F.2d at 829 & n.4.
Chief Judge Seitz was the sole member of the court who would not remand for any
purpose. 712 F.2d at 829 & n.5.
71. See 712 F.2d at 829.
72. 712 F.2d at 830-34 (Garth, J.) (citing United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d
1205 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978) (per
18
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Garth regarded the question as "a close one." 73 He summarized the argu-
ments in favor of expanding the exclusionary rule: since prosecutors often
use revocation proceedings as an alternative to trying a probationer on the
new criminal charges, proponents of expansion argue that the same proce-
dural protections should be required as are provided in a criminal trial.
74
Further, since probationers retain the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the rule's proponents contend that the exclusionary
rule is equally necessary to deter official misconduct and to preserve judicial
integrity in the probation context.
75
Judge Garth then identified the competing arguments raised by those
opposed to applying the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings:
expansion of the rule beyond criminal trials would add only minimally to its
deterrent effect, while it would significantly obstruct the remedial purposes
of the probation system. 76 Opponents of expansion point out that the
Supreme Court has not required the suppression of unconstitutionally seized
evidence in all circumstances 77 and that a distinction is justified in the case
curiam); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United States v.
Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817
(7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir.
1970). For further discussion of these decisions see note 26 and accompanying text
supra.
73. 712 F.2d at 830 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment).
74. Id. at 830-31 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment). Along the same lines, Judge Garth noted that those in favor of applying
the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings
assert that the Supreme Court has consistently applied the exclusionary rule
to affirmative proof offered by the government in state and federal criminal
trials, and has never exempted from the operation of the rule any ad-
judica[tive] proceeding in which the government offers unconstitutionally
seized evidence in direct support of a charge that may subject the victim of
a search to imprisonment.
Id. at 830 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
75. Id. at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment). Judge Garth recognized the proponents' contention that making proba-
tion revocation proceedings an exception to the exclusionary rule would detract from
the rule's deterrent effect. Id. at 830-31 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part and from tae judgment). Further, proponents argue that unreasonable intru-
sions into probationers' lives should be specifically discouraged, since these would
tend to disrupt rehabilitation efforts. Id.
76. Id. at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment). Judge Garth stated that those who would limit the exclusionary rule feel
that deterrence is adequately served by the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence in the prosecution of substantive criminal offenses. Id. On the other hand,
they argue that applying the rule in revocation hearings would hinder the probation
system by depriving the courts of relevant evidence bearing on the extent of the pro-
bationer's rehabilitation. Id. Judge Garth continued: "Moreover, they contend, it
would force probation officers to substitute for the informal process of evaluation of a
probationer's rehabilitation the more time-consuming task of amassing formally ad-
missible evidence." Id.
77. Id. Although judicial integrity is implicated whenever the government seeks
[Vol. 29: p. 954
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of a probationer, who has less of a right to be free from government supervi-
sion than does the ordinary citizen.
78
Judge Garth recognized that the Supreme Court had clearly mandated
a balancing of interests analysis for ruling on proposals to extend the exclu-
sionary rule beyond the context of a criminal trial. 79 The majority stated
that the Third Circuit had concluded that exclusion from the revocation
hearing of reliable evidence bearing on a probationer's rehabilitation would
contribute little to deterrence of unlawful searches and seizures,80 and that
to use unconstitutionally seized evidence, opponents of expansion note that the
Supreme Court has not required suppression in all circumstances. Id. For a discus-
sion of those circumstances in which the Supreme Court has found the rule inapplica-
ble, see notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra. Finally, Judge Garth mentioned
that opponents argue that the availability of sanctions against police officers who
conduct unlawful searches provides an adequate deterrent without drastically inter-
fering in the probation process by depriving authorities of relevant information. 712
F.2d at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment)
(citing United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970)
(availability of state and federal penalties against police officers conducting unlawful
searches adequately safeguards parolee's rights)).
78. 712 F.2d at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment).
79. Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)). For a discussion
of the Calandra Court's explanation, see note 23 supra. For a discussion of Calandra
and the balancing test, see notes 19-24 and accompanying text supra. Judge Garth
emphasized the fact that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right
but rather a mechanism designed to deter fourth amendment violations. 712 F.2d at
832 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment) (quot-
ing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 ("The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress
the injury to the privacy of the search victim . . . . Instead, the rule's prime purpose
is to deter future unlawful police conduct.")).
80. 712 F.2d at 832 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment). Judge Garth relied on Supreme Court indications that the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule could not be empirically tested and that a court should
rely instead "on its own assumptions of human nature and the interrelationship of
the various components of the law enforcement system." Id. (quoting United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). Because police officers conducting a search gener-
ally aim to convict the target of the search, Judge Garth explained, excluding unlaw-
fully seized evidence at criminal trials has a direct deterrent effect on unlawful
searches and seizures. 712 F.2d at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part and from the judgment) (citations omitted). However, according to Judge
Garth, use of evidence at a probation revocation hearing "falls outside the offending
officer's zone of primary interest." Id. at 832 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part and from the judgment) (quoting Jan's, 428 U.S. at 458). Further, Judge
Garth noted, it is unlikely that state police officers would seize evidence for use in a
federal probation revocation proceeding. 712 F.2d at 833 (Garth, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). Since this use of the evidence is
probably not contemplated by the offending officer, Judge Garth concluded that ex-
cluding unlawfully seized evidence in revocation hearings would add little to the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Id. Judge Garth qualified the Third Cir-
cuit's ruling by pointing out that the court had assumed that the police did not know
that the target of their search was a probationer. Id. n.1. The Third Circuit, he said,
was expressly leaving open the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be
applied in a probation revocation proceeding if the police knew or had reason to
know that the target of their search was a probationer. Id. (citing United States v.
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this minor contribution was outweighed by the rule's significant injury to
society's interest in protecting itself against convicted criminals who abuse
their conditional liberty.81 Judge Garth announced the Third Circuit's
holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to probation revocation
proceedings.
82
Judges Gibbons and Aldisert were not persuaded by the majority's posi-
tion on the exclusionary rule and joined in dissent. 83 Judge Gibbons found
application of the exclusionary rule necessary to protect privacy rights.84 He
would not evaluate the exclusionary rule solely on the basis of its deterrent
effect, as he felt the majority did.8 5 In his view, the rule was designed to
Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982) (exclusionary rule applicable in probation revoca-
tion hearing where probation officer, aware of probationer's status, seized evidence
illegally); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975) (exclusionary rule
not applicable to probation revocation hearing where, at the time of search, police
had no knowledge of probationer's status); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95
(5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (petitioner admits that exclusionary rule is inapplicable
to probation revocation hearings absent police harassment of probationer)).
81. 712 F.2d at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment). Judge Garth stated that it must be remembered that a probationer's
liberty is only conditional, since he has already been found guilty of a crime. Id
(citation omitted). For a discussion of the lower standard of procedural fairness
which is required in probation revocation proceedings compared to criminal trials,
see note 25 supra. Although the probationer retains a right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, society has a great interest in receiving all available evi-
dence bearing on whether he has observed the conditions of his probation. 712 F.2d
at 833-34 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
Applying the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings would signifi-
cantly interfere with society's ability to check compliance with the conditions of pro-
bation and to thereby protect itself from additional antisocial acts committed by that
probationer. d at 834 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment).
82. 712 F.2d at 831 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment).
83. 712 F.2d at 846-48 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judges Gibbons and Aldisert
also dissented on the supervisory rule issue. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text
infra.
84. 712 F.2d at 846-47 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons found Judge
Garth's reliance on the "conditional" liberty of the probationer unsound. Id. at 846
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons asserted that probationers have the same
interest as non-probationers in the zones of privacy and personal autonomy which
are protected by the fourth amendment. Id. at 846-47 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). He
wrote that the nature of the forum in which the fruits of an unconstitutional search
would be revealed was not a valid basis for distinction among privacy interests. Id. at
847 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
85. Id at 848 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons criticized the majority
for speculating that the rule has a deterrent effect in criminal trials, and then
"jump[ing] to the equally unsupported assumption that non-applicatton of the rule in
parole revocation proceedings will have no encouraging effect." Id. at 847 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Gibbons felt that, to the contrary, the police
might be less interested in convictions than in having parolees and probationers in-
carcerated under the lower evidentiary standards applicable to revocation proceed-
ings, and hence the expansion of the exclusionary rule may have a very real effect in
deterring illegal searches and seizures. Id.
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prevent the further violation of fourth amendment rights which results from
public exploitation of material which should have remained private in the
first place.86 Judge Sloviter dissented separately on this issue, finding the
exclusionary rule appropriate in the probation revocation context as a deter-
rent to police misconduct and as a safeguard of privacy rights.8 7
The court unanimously held that the district court did not err in hold-
ing that it had the power to revoke Mollica's probation, in failing to state its
reasons for the sentence, or in refusing to grant immunity to defense
witnesses.
8 8
The judges of the Third Circuit were divided on the issue of whether
the district court erred in failing either to postpone the probation revocation
86. Id. at 848 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Although the unconstitutional search is
the initial invasion of privacy, Judge Gibbons viewed the public exploitation of the
illegally obtained evidence as an aggravation of the constitutional injury. Id. He
asserted that in any proceeding where this evidence is allowed to be exploited, the
court becomes a party to the invasion of privacy. Id. The exclusionary rule, Judge
Gibbons felt, was necessary to protect judicial integrity and prevent the erosion of the
court's moral authority. Id. at 847-48 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
87. 712 F.2d at 849 (Sloviter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and con-
curring in the judgment). Judge Sloviter would remand the case and direct the dis-
trict court to hold a suppression hearing. Id. However, since a majority of the court
held the exclusionary rule inapplicable, Judge Sloviter voted to affirm. Id.
88. 712 F.2d at 829 (per curiam). Mollica had argued that the district court
had no authority to revoke his probation after the expiration of its five year term. Id.
See id. at 834 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judg-
ment). Judge Garth explained that the expiration of the five year time limit on Mol-
lica's probation did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to
revoke his probation where formal revocation proceedings had been commenced (by
issuance of an arrest warrant) within the five year period. Id. at 834-35 (Garth, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3651, 3653 (1978)).
Judge Garth also stated that it was the court's unanimous view that the district
court was not required to explain its decision to resentence Mollica to the maximum
sentence it originally might have imposed, even though Mollica had served almost all
of his five year term of probation. 712 F.2d at 838-39 (Garth, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part and from the judgment) (citationssomitted).
The Third Circuit ruled that the district court did not err in refusing to order
the disclosure of the informant's identity. 712 F.2d at 839 (Garth, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part and from the judgment) (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (government has qualified privilege to refuse to disclose the iden-
tity of a confidential informant in the absence of the declarant's overriding need for
this information for the preparation of a defense)). The Third Circuit also held that
the district court did not err in refusing to grant immunity to defense witnesses
Stagno and Fimmano. 712 F.2d at 839-40 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part and in the judgment). Where statutory use immunity had not been denied by
the government with the "deliberate intention of distorting the fact-finding process,"
the court was not justified in intervening under the statute. Id. at 840 (Garth, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment) (citing United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979)) (further cita-
tions omitted). Further, Judge Garth stated, "judicially fashioned" witness immu-
nity was improper in the absence of a timely application, indicating the essential and
exculpatory nature of the defense witness' testimony. 712 F.2d at 840 (Garth, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and in the judgment) (citing Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981)).
1983-84]
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hearing until after trial of Mollica's state charges or to grant Mollica use
immunity if he chose to testify at the revocation hearing.8 9 There was no
contention that the district court was required by the Constitution or by
statute to grant one of Mollica's alternative requests. 90 The disagreement
centered on the propriety of adopting a supervisory rule for district courts
within the Third Circuit which would require them to grant either postpone-
ment or use immunity to probationers facing revocation proceedings based
on pending criminal charges. 9 1
Judge Garth was joined by Judges Gibbons, Aldisert, and Weis in advo-
cating the Third Circuit's adoption of a supervisory rule which would direct
a district court faced with a probation revocation proceeding based on state
criminal charges either to postpone the revocation hearing until after the
state criminal charges were resolved or to grant use immunity to the proba-
tioner.92 Judge Garth felt that postponement of the revocation proceedings
until after the trial of the criminal charges would enable a probationer to
testify at the revocation hearing without risk of self-incrimination with re-
89. 712 F.2d at 829 (per curiam). For an outline of the division of the members
of the Third Circuit, see note 70 and accompanying text supra.
90. See 712 F.2d at 836-37 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment). Even those members who favored adopting the proposed super-
visory rule recognized that it was not required by due process, by the privilege
against self-incrimination, or on any other mandatory ground. See id; id at 848-49
(Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Because Mollica had to choose whether to testify at his probation revocation
hearing at the risk that his testimony might be used against him, his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and his due process right to be heard at the for-
mer proceeding were arguably implicated. See id at 842-43 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
However, as Chief Judge Seitz explained, the fifth amendment's protection applies
only to compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 842 (Seitz, C.J., concurring) (citing Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966)). Although the risk of providing evi-
dence to state prosecutors might burden Mollica's right to be heard to some extent,
Chief Judge Seitz explained that not every burden upon the exercise of a constitu-
tional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is uncon-
stitutional. Id. (citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978)). Chief Judge
Seitz viewed the due process issue as whether compelling an election between waiver
and exercise of constitutional rights impairs to an appreciable extent any of the poli-
cies underlying the right asserted. Id. (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
213 (1970)). Chief Judge Seitz felt that neither the policies underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination nor those underlying the due process right to be heard were
appreciably impaired by the forced election faced by Mollica. Id. at 842-43 (Seitz,
C.J., concurring).
91. See id. at 836-37 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment).
92. Id. Judge Garth stated that a probationer facing a revocation hearing prior
to the disposition of related criminal charges faces a "dilemma":
If he chooses to testify in the probation revocation hearing, he may compro-
mise his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in connection
with the related criminal proceeding. If he decides not to testify in the
revocation hearing, his probation may be revoked even though he may later
be acquitted of the related criminal charges.
Id. at 836 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
Judge Garth viewed his proposed rule as an appropriate solution to this dilemma. Id.
[Vol. 29: p. 954
23
Lipschultz: Criminal Procedure - Probation - Exclusionary Rule Is Inapplicabl
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
spect to a later trial, and that this protection would not injure the interests of
the state or federal governments. 9 3 In cases where the government insisted
or the district court decided that the probation revocation hearing must be
held first,94 Judge Garth favored a rule directing the district court to grant
the probationer use immunity.95
In a separate dissent, Judge Gibbons, joined by Judge Aldisert, agreed
with Judge Garth that the proposed supervisory rule should be adopted. 96
Judge Gibbons found the procedural rule proposed by Judge Garth to be
entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's statements on the supervisory
power of the federal courts.
9 7
Chief Judge Seitz, joined by Judge Sloviter, took the position that re-
quiring district courts either to postpone a probation revocation hearing
based on pending criminal charges until the resolution of those charges or to
93. Id. at 837-38 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment). Because revocation proceedings would have been initiated by arrest war-
rant or petition, Judge Galth explained, the district court would retain jurisdiction
over the probationer even after the term of his probation had expired. Id. at 836
(Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). See note 88
supra. Any danger to the public could be avoided by taking the probationer into
custody pending the outcome of the revocation hearing. 712 F.2d at 836 (Garth, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
94. 712 F.2d at 838 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment). Judge Garth viewed postponement as the preferred alternative, and
cited what he termed "substantial" authority for a postponement rule. Id. at 837
(Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment) (citing
ABA's Standards Relating to Probation § 5.3 (Approved Draft 1970); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 301.3 (1962); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 384 (1975) (California Supreme Court exercises supervisory authority requiring
postponement or use immunity in identical circumstances)) (further citations omit-
ted). For a discussion of these authorities, see notes 48-52 and accompanying text
supra. Judge Garth also drew support from the testimony of Mollica's probation of-
ficer that it was the standard policy of the United States Probation Office to delay
revocation proceedings until after the resolution of pending state charges. 712 F.2d
at 837 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment)
(citations omitted).
95. 712 F.2d at 838 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment). Although he felt that the better practice would be for probation revo-
cation proceedings to be postponed if possible, Judge Garth would leave it to the
district courts' discretion to determine whether postponement or use immunity was
appropriate in each case. Id
96. Id at 848-49 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
97. Id Judge Gibbons noted that a judge-made procedural rule not specifically
required by a statute or the Constitution is appropriate if, as in the instant case, it
satisfies the threefold purposes underlying the use of supervisory powers: "to imple-
ment a remedy for violation of recognized rights . . .; to preserve judicial integrity by
ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury
.; and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct . . . ." Id at 849
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Hastings, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1978-79
(1983)). Considering these purposes of the supervisory power in light of the proba-
tioner's dilemma, Judge Gibbons found that the proposed rule assures informed revo-
cation proceedings, protects the probationer's privilege against self-incrimination,
and prevents prosecuting authorities from shifting the burden of proving the case to
the probationer. Id.
1983-841
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/14
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
grant the probationers use immunity was an improper exercise of the Third
Circuit's supervisory power.98 The Chief Judge was not convinced of the
need for a postponement rule, given that the general practice of the proba-
tion authorities was to delay revocation proceedings until after trial of the
criminal charges. 99 Further, he believed that the postponement decision was
best left to the discretion of the district court because it involved a balancing
of several relevant factors.' 00 A grant of use immunity, Chief Judge Seitz
continued, would be unjustified in this context because of the added burden
it would place on the state prosecuting authorities, who would have to satisfy
the independent source requirement.' 0 '
Judge Adams, joined by Judges Hunter and Becker, agreed with Chief
98. 712 F.2d at 843-45 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Seitz did not argue
that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals does not have the supervisory power to pro-
mulgate rules of practice and procedure for judicial administration. Id. However, he
did not find the problem of whether probation revocation hearings based on state
criminal charges should be postponed a proper subject for an appeals court's supervi-
sory power. d. at 844-45 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). For further discussion of the su-
pervisory power, see notes 53-65 and accompanying text supra.
99. 712 F.2d at 843 (Seitz, C.J.). For further discussion of this policy, see notes
53-65 and accompanying text supra.
100. 712 F.2d at 843-44 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Seitz found the
district court in a better position to balance those considerations relevant to whether
the revocation hearing should be postponed. Id. at 843 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
First, he stated, the inconvenience that might result from an untimely motion for
postponement should be considered. Id. (citing United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d
769, 777-78 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (district court's refusal to grant defense witness im-
munity did not deny constitutionally protected fairness because demand for immu-
nity was untimely and would, if granted, have resulted in substantial inconvenience
to prosecution), cert. dented, 499 U.S. 1077 (1981)). For a further discussion of Turkish,
see note 47 and accompanying text supra. A second consideration identified by Chief
Judge Seitz was the status of the pending state criminal proceeding. 712 F.2d at 844
(Seitz, C.J., concurring). Since the state charges against Mollica had been dismissed,
postponement until resolution of those charges was not a viable alternative. Id. Fi-
nally, Chief Judge Seitz stated that postponement might be inappropriate when the
request for postponement is made at the beginning of the state criminal process. Id.
Because a state criminal proceeding might continue for a significant time, postpone-
ment of the revocation proceeding may result in a loss of evidence or witnesses. Id &
n.3. If the request for postponement was made when the criminal trial was near
completion, Chief Judge Seitz did not see the same inconvenience and prejudice to
the government as a likely result. d.
101. 712 F.2d at 844 (Seitz, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 734-37 (court of appeals' use of supervisory power to suppress evidence
seized in violation of fourth amendment rights of third party not before the court.
inappropriate because loss of probative evidence significantly burdens law enforce-
ment efforts of executive branch); Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393, 398 (3d Cir. 1975)
(declining to exercise supervisory power to order assignment of new judge for resen-
tencing in state criminal proceeding out of respect for court system of equal sover-
eignty)). Chief Judge Seitz recognized state law enforcement as an integral function
of state government. Id. at 845 (Seitz, C.J., concurring) (citing Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)). Because use immunity is generally accompanied by im-
munization of the "fruits" of the immunized witness' testimony, Chief Judge Seitz
stated, the state would have to prove that evidence it sought to use against the proba-
tioner in a subsequent criminal trial was derived from a source wholly independent of
the testimony at the revocation hearing. 712 F.2d at 845 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
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Judge Seitz on the supervisory rule issue,l02 though he would have re-
manded the case to let Mollica testify if he so chose.10 3 Judge Adams con-
cluded that the supervisory rule proposed by Judge Garth10 4 was without
legitimate basis and deficient on three grounds: first, Judge Garth did not
adequately define a procedure which the district court could follow; 10 5 sec-
ond, the proposed rule swept too broadly and was too rigid for the circum-
stances;' 0 6 and third, the proposed rule constituted an inappropriate use of
He regarded this consequence as a substantial burden on the state's law enforcement
process. Id.
The Chief judge concluded that granting use immunity would have been an
abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Id. at 846 (Seitz, C.J., concur-
ring). Because the state criminal charges had been dismissed, he felt postponement
was not a viable option. d. Although Chief Judge Seitz felt that the district court
had refused postponement based on its erroneous belief that delay would deprive it of
subject matter jurisdiction, he saw no purpose in remanding the case, as the court's
error did not deprive Mollica of his option to testify. See id. For a discussion of the
subject matter jurisdiction issue, see note 88 supra.
102. See 712 F.2d 849-53 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment).
103. Id. at 849 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment). judge Adams believed that had the district court been assured of its
continued jurisdiction over Mollica, it might have exercised its discretion to postpone-
the revocation hearing until the state proceedings. Id. at 849-50 (Adams, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). For a discussion of the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction issue, see note 88 supra. If that was the case, Mollica might
later have chosen to testify at the revocation hearing. 712 F.2d at 850 (Adams, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). Judge Adams stated:
"When a district court's exercise of discretion is predicated on, a misapprehension of
the law, the appropriate course for an appellate court is to resolve the legal question
and remand the matter so that the district court can proceed in light of the clarifica-
tion." Id. This was especially important in this case since it appeared Mollica's right
to testify may have been compromised. Id. Judge Adams felt that the state's dismis-
sal of the charges against Mollica in the interim provided an additional reason to
remand and allow him to testify. Id.
104. See 712 F.2d at 835-38 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
and from the judgment). judge Garth's proposed rule is discussed at notes 92-95 and
accompanying text supra.
105. 712 F.2d at 850-51 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment). Judge Adams found that the proposed rule provided no gui-
dance with respect to the length of the postponement or its potential effect on the
statute of limitations. Id. judge Adams criticized judge Garth's unexplained sugges-
tion that postponement be the general rule and use immunity the exception. d He
believed that, in requiring district courts to articulate their reasons for choosing
either postponement or use immunity, judge Garth's rule would apparently limit the
district court's discretion to a choice between the two. d. Judge Adams felt that any
rule which limited the district court's discretion ought to specify more precisely the
limitations imposed. Id. at 851 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment). Judge Adams concluded that an enumeration of factors to
guide the district court's exercise of discretion would have been more acceptable than
the mandatory rule proposed by Judge Garth. Id.
106. 712 F.2d at 851 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment). Judge Adams pointed out that the proposed rule allows the court
only two options. Id. He argued that in exceptional circumstances the government
may show a compelling need to avoid postponement, while a grant of use immunity
might also be inappropriate. Id. In ordinary probation revocation cases a grant of
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the supervisory power.10 7
The judges of the Third Circuit were unable to reconcile their differ-
ences and produce a majority vote for remand with consistent instruc-
tions. 0 8 Thus, the district court decision was affirmed despite the fact that,
for a variety of reasons, nine of the ten judges would have remanded the case
use immunity would do little to help the probationer's case, but would handicap the
state's case in a subsequent criminal trial to the extent that the state has to prove that
the evidence is from an independent source. M. For discussion of the independent
source burden, see note 47 and accompanying text supra. Judge Adams expressed
concern that a recent decision of the Supreme Court raised doubts as to the court's
ability to grant immunity. Id. (citing Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608, 616
(1983)). Judge Adams concluded that it is more desirable to allow district courts
discretionary authority to grant a postponement without requiring them to grant use
immunity in any case in which they did not grant a postponement. Id.
107. 712 F.2d at 852-53 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment). Judge Adams found that the proposed rule infringed on the
state government unnecessarily and in an unprecedented manner. Id. at 852 (Adams,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). He noted that
previous supervisory rules promulgated by the Third Circuit were generally limited
to internal judicial matters, and rarely had a direct impact on the prerogatives of the
states. Id. For a discussion of the supervisory power, see notes 53-65 and accompany-
ing text supra. A rule with an impact on state prerogatives would be justified only by
a strong showing of need, which Judge Adams felt Mollica had not made. 712 F.2d
at 852 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and in the judgment). Judge
Adams believed that the district court would have granted a postponement had it not
been for the jurisdictional question; hence the need for a supervisory rule was not
demonstrated on the facts of this case. Id.
108. Id. at 829 (per curiam). Judge Adams, joined by Judges Becker and
Hunter, disagreed with the court's decision that the case could not be remanded
without a single justification which commanded a majority of the court. 712 F.2d at
853 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). He
felt that a remand could be based on a variety of grounds, even though none of them
had sufficient support to become binding precedent. Id. (citations omitted). In Ad-
ams' opinion, the district court could not invoke the exclusionary rule or grant use
immunity, since a majority of the court had rejected both remedies. Id. Instead,
Judge Adams found that a remand could be ordered to ensure that Mollica's right to
testify had not been compromised by the district court's error regarding its jurisdic-
tion as this option had not been foreclosed by a majority of the court. Id. He con-
cluded that "it is scant consolation to Mollica that nine judges of this Court have
concluded that his rights may have been violated in a proceeding which imposed a
five year sentence." Id.
Mollica's petition for rehearing was denied by a majority of the Third Circuit.
Id. at 853. Judge Adams, joined by Judges Becker and Hunter, would have granted
the petition because Mollica had indicated that he would testify without immunity
on remand and he stated that his testimony would demonstrate that he had not
violated the terms of his probation. Id. at 854 (Adams, J., Statement Sur Petition for
Rehearing). Further, Judge Adams felt that affirming the district court judgment
despite the fact that a majority would remand on some ground was inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's approach in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commis-
sion, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983) (judgment of court of appeals affirmed because five mem-
bers of court would affirm, despite three different underlying approaches). 712 F.2d
at 854 (Adams, J., Statement Sur Petition for Rehearing). Judge Weis also would
have granted the petition for rehearing on the basis of Mollica's expression of willing-
ness to testify without immunity. Id. (Weis, J., Statement Sur Petition for
Rehearing).
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to the lower court. 0 9
Reviewing the Third Circuit's decision in Bazzano, it is submitted that
the court properly disposed of the exclusionary rule, constitutional law, and
supervisory power issues.' ° However, it is further submitted that because
the nine judges who would have remanded the case"' could have found
some common basis for doing so, the order affirming the district court un-
necessarily condoned a denial of substantial justice to defendant Mollica.1 12
In refusing to expand the application of the exclusionary rule to proba-
tion revocation proceedings, the Third Circuit joins an apparent consensus
among the courts of appeals. "13 In addition, this conclusion seems consistent
with the Supreme Court's inclination to limit any further expansion of the
exclusionary rule. 114 Although valid arguments might support a contrary
conclusion,'' 5 it is submitted that the goal of uniform federal law tips the
balance against expansion of the exclusionary rule.
In determining that the probationer does not face an unconstitutional
109. Id. at 853 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the
judgment). Judges Aldisert, Gibbons, Weis and Garth would have the district court
exercise its supervisory power and advance a rule which would either grant the pro-
bationer use immunity at the revocation hearing or postpone the hearing until after
the disposition of the state charges. Id. at 835-38 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part and from the judgment). Judges Adams, Hunter and Becker would
remand not on the basis of a supervisory rule but to enable Mollica to testify at the
revocation hearing if he so chose. Id. at 849-53 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part and from the judgment). Judges Higginbotham and Sloviter, as well
as Aldisert and Gibbons, would remand for a suppression hearing. Id. at 829 & n.4.
110. For a discussion of the court's holding that the exclusionary rule is inappli-
cable to probation revocation proceedings, see notes 71-87 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the court's holding that a forced election between exercising
the right to present a defense and the right to remain silent does not offend a proba-
tioner's constitutional rights, see note 90 and accompanying text supra. For a discus-
sion of the majority's rejection of the supervisory rule proposed by Judge Garth, see
notes 98-107 and accompanying text supra.
111. See 712 F.2d at 829 & nn. 2-4 (per curiam). Only Chief Judge Seitz would
not remand for any purpose. Id. & n.5. For a discussion of the various grounds on
which nine judges would remand, see note 109 supra.
112. For a discussion of the impropriety of the issuance of an order of affirmance
under the circumstances of this case, see note 102 and accompanying text supra.
113. Six of the seven courts of appeals which have considered this issue have
declined to expand the exclusionary rule. These courts have employed the same ba-
sic rationale utilized by the Third Circuit in Bazzano, that the increased deterrent
effect of expansion is outweighed by the cost in terms of losing valuable evidence.
For a listing of these cases, see note 26 supra. See also United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974). For a discussion of Calandra, see notes 20-23 and accompanying text
supra.
114. For a discussion of the Court's apparent reluctance to extend the exclusion-
ary rule beyond the standard criminal context, see notes 19-25 and accompanying
text supra.
115. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (application
of exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings necessary to preserve integrity
of hearing). For a discussion of Judge Garth's summary of the arguments concerning
the expansion of the exclusionary rule in this case, see notes 74-78 and accompanying
text supra.
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dilemma when revocation proceedings are initiated prior to trial on the un-
derlying state charges, it is submitted that the court properly applied the
McCautha standard. 11 6 The court properly determined that a forced election
does not offend the policies underlying the right to defend and the right to
remain silent.
1 17
It is further submitted that the Third Circuit properly refused to adopt
Judge Garth's proposed supervisory rule requiring district courts to grant
postponement or use immunity in probation revocation proceedings based
on pending state criminal charges.' 18 As one commentator has recom-
mended, the exercise of the supervisory power should be carefully scruti-
nized, or else the legitimacy of the judiciary is impugned." 9 Bazzano
illustrates that at least some members of the Third Circuit feel that the su-
pervisory power is to be exercised sparingly and within prescribed limits.
1 2 0
Both Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Adams acknowledge the recent criticism
of the Third Circuit for irresponsible exercise of the supervisory power.'
21
This responsiveness to criticism and responsible judicial self restraint com-
mands respect for the court as an institution.
116. See 712 F.2d at 836 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment); id. at 842-43 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). The court appropriately
ruled that the forced election did not fail the McGautha test of constitutionality; there-
fore, the grant of a postponement or of use immunity was not constitutionally man-
dated. See 712 F.2d at 836-37 (Garth J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
from the judgment) (citations omitted).
117. For a discussion of the McGautha test and the conclusion of the courts of
appeals that the probationer's forced election on these facts does not violate his con-
stitutional rights, see notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
118. For a discussion of the supervisory rule proposed by Judge Garth, see notes
92-95 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the majority's rejection of the
proposed rule, see notes 98-107 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 534-37. Judge Schwartz asserts that the
imposition of a procedural rule under the supervisory power should be limited to
three sets of circumstances. Id. The first set of circumstances considered appropriate
for an exercise of the court's supervisory power is where the power to make rules in
that particular context has been allocated to the court of appeals. Id. The second
situation arises when the power to promulgate a rule rests with another body, but
there remains a need for supplementation beyond that of judicial interpretation. Id.
The third occasion cited by Judge Schwartz is when the rulemaker has failed to
promulgate a rule and a procedural void results. Id.
In other cases, the proper procedure for adopting procedural rules has been es-
tablished by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See id. at 539-40 & nn. 143
& 148 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976)). See also 712 F.2d at 852 (Adams, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
120. See 712 F.2d at 843 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); 712 F.2d at 852-53 (Adams, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). Chief Judge Seitz
wrote that "not every problem faced by a district court is properly the subject of a
supervisory rule." 712 F.2d at 843 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). Judge Adams was in
agreement "that the promulgation of such a rule constitutes an [in]appropriate exer-
cise of our supervisory power." 712 F.2d at 852 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part and from the judgment).
121. See 712 F.2d at 843 n.2 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); 712 F.2d at 852 n.6 (Ad-
ams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
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Chief Judge Seitz' 22 and Judge Adams 23 aptly identified the federal-
ism concerns implicated by the proposed rule.124 They also noted that sepa-
ration of powers principles counsel against the imposition of a rule having a
direct impact on the prerogatives of another branch of the federal govern-
ment. ' 25 In view of these limitations on the supervisory power and the dubi-
122. 712 F.2d at 843-45 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Seitz recognized
the substantial burden which would be imposed on the state prosecutors if the federal
court granted the probationer use immunity. See t. A grant of use immunity would
require the state prosecutor to establish an independent source for evidence revealed
in immunized testimony, which the Chief Judge correctly saw as an interference with
an integral function of the state government, i.e., law enforcement. See id. See also
Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393, 398 (3d Cir. 1975) (declining to exercise supervisory
power to order assignment of new judge for resentencing in state criminal proceeding
out of respect for court system of equal sovereignty). For a further discussion of Chief
Judge Seitz' analysis of the federalism issue, see note 101 and accompanying text
supra.
123. 712 F.2d at 852 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from
the judgment). Judge Adams recognized the value of adopting supervisory rules,
especially when those rules address matters "peculiarly within the province of the
judiciary." Id. However, he noted that the proposed rule was not within the prov-
ince of the court. Id. Instead, the proposed rule would regulate areas historically
within the domain of other branches of the federal government, as well as impact on
the prerogatives of the states. Id. Judge Adams was particularly shocked by the
broad scope of the proposed rule and its impact on the states, absent any real evi-
dence of need for such a rule. Id.
Judge Adams also questioned the procedure by which the proposed rule was to
be adopted. Id. He noted the existence of procedures for adopting federal court rules
and the policy favoring uniformity among the federal circuits. See t'd. The existence
of such procedures distinguishes federal supervisory power from state supervisory
power. See id. The state courts are free to exercise their supervisory power without
regard to issues of uniformity among the states. See Coleman v. California, 13 Cal. 3d
867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975) (adopting supervisory rule nearly iden-
tical to rule proposed in this case for courts within the California state system). For a
discussion of Coleman, see notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted
that the Third Circuit did not adequately address the issue of a federal court supervi-
sory rule impacting upon the functions of state courts.
124. See notes 122-23 supra. See also Schwartz, supra note 53, at 531 (citing
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) (federal courts may not prescribe proce-
dural rules or make policy judgments for the states)).
125. See 712 F.2d at 844-45 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); 712 F.2d at 852 (Adams, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). Judge Adams found
the proposed rule's intrusion on the prerogatives of the executive branch to be unac-
ceptable. 712 F.2d at 852 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and fr6m
the judgment). He would not have been as opposed to the rule if it had addressed
issues that were within the province of the judiciary. See id. Chief Judge Seitz also
objected to the rule on the grounds that it unnecessarily burdened a co-equal branch
of government. 712 F.2d at 844 (Seitz, C.J., concurring) (citing United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734-37 (1979) (court of appeals' use of supervisory power to
suppress evidence seized in violation of fourth amendment rights of third party not
before the court inappropriate because loss of probative evidence significantly bur-
dens law enforcement efforts of executive branch)). The principle of separation of
powers should limit an appellate court's exercise of its supervisory power. See
Schwartz, supra note 53, at 527-31.
Judge Adams also perceived a possible bar to the Third Circuit's adoption of
this procedural rule in a recent Supreme Court decision. 712 F.2d at 851 (Adams, J.,
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ous wisdom and necessity for the proposed rule,' 26 it is submitted that the
court properly declined to accept Judge Garth's proposal.
The per curiam and individual opinions of the members of the court
recognized that the district court's denial of Mollica's request for a postpone-
ment was motivated by its unfounded belief that any delay would cause it to
lose jurisdiction over the probationer.1 2 7 The Third Circuit unanimously
recognized that the judge would have retained jurisdiction over the case and
power to revoke Mollica's probation after the expiration of the five year stat-
utory period because revocation proceedings had been formally begun prior
to the expiration of the five year statutory period.' 28 It is submitted that a
majority of the members of the court could have agreed that "[t]he district
court's error clearly is inconsistent with a sound exercise of discretion,"'
' 29
concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment) (citing Pillsbury v.
Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983) (no court has the authority to immunize a witness)).
Judge Adams felt that the Supreme Court may have meant that the judiciary lacks
the nonstatutory power to immunize a witness. Id. See also Schwartz, supra note 53,
at 532 (citing United States v. Paynor, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (Supreme Court has held
certain areas improper for the exercise of the supervisory power)). For further discus-
sion of defense witness immunity, see note 47 and accompanying text supra. For fur-
ther discussion of the Supreme Court's statements on the exercise of a court's
supervisory power, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
126. See 712 F.2d at 852-53 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
and in the judgment). Judge Adams appropriately noted that if the district court
and probation officers had not mistakenly believed that granting a postponement
would result in the court's loss of jurisdiction over the probation,
the probation officer undoubtedly would have followed its usual policy and
awaited the disposition of the pending state criminal charges before seeking
a revocation hearing. If the probation officials had sought an earlier hear-
ing, the district court most likely would have denied the request. Only a
misunderstanding about the district court's jurisdiction, and not the ab-
sence of a supervisory rule, prevented the postponement of Mollica's hear-
ing while state proceedings were pending. Thus, the proposed rule may
well be a solution to a nonexistent problem.
Id. at 852 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment).
127. See 712 F.2d at 828; 712 F.2d at 834-35 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part and from the judgment); 712 F.2d at 845-46 (Seitz, C.J., concurring);
712 F.2d at 849 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and from the judg-
ment). For a discussion of the jurisdiction issue, see note 88 and accompanying text
supra. The jurisdiction issue arose because the probation revocation proceedings were
commenced only two days before Mollica's five year prison term was set to expire.
712 F.2d at 824. V
128. See 712 F.2d at 834-35 (Garth, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part and
in the judgment). For the court's analysis of the jurisdiction issue, see note 88 and
accompanying text supra.
129. 712 F.2d at 846 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Seitz was in agree-
ment that the district court's error regarding jurisdiction would normally require
remand, were it not for the procedural posture of the case. Id. He found that the fact
that the state charges were dropped made postponement "no longer a viable rem-
edy." Id. Moreover, Chief Judge Seitz believed a remand to be ineffectual in afford-
ing Mollica a proper exercise of the district court's discretion concerning whether to
postpone the revocation hearing or grant him use immunity. Id. Chief Judge Seitz
[Vol. 29: p. 954
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and remanded for a new discretionary determination. 3 0
The clear impact of Bazzano is to deny application of the exclusionary
rule to probation revocation hearings. 13 1 It is submitted that the court's
ruling on that issue indicates the Third Circuit's adherence to the Supreme
Court's position which sharply limits any extension of the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule.
It is suggested that the Bazzano court's reluctance to exercise its supervi-
sory power was grounded somewhat on the posture of the case before it.132
It is hoped that the court's responsiveness to criticism regarding self-restraint
will not unduly hinder the court in the future. Thus the court's recognition
in Bazzano of the procedural protections due to probationers may translate
into the adoption of supervisory rules in areas where due process safeguards
are even more rudimentary. 1
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would also not remand in order to give Mollica a chance to choose whether to testify
at his revocation hearing because he was not deprived of that right. Id.
It is submitted that although the state charges against Mollica were dropped,
the remedy for the jurisdictional error was viable at that time and Mollica was enti-
tled to a sound discretionary ruling. Despite the procedural posture of the case, a
remedy is still available because Mollica could choose to testify on remand.
130. For a discussion of the propriety of remanding the case where the district
court misapprehends the law, see note 103 supra.
It is submitted that Judge Adams was correct in asserting that the court improp-
erly affirmed the judgment of the lower court on the grounds that no single justifica-
tion for remand commanded a majority. See 712 F.2d at 853 (Adams, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part and from the judgment). A majority of the members of the
court need only agree on the disposition of the case, not on the rationale supporting
that disposition. Id As Adams pointed out, where nine of ten judges would vote to
remand on some ground, "[ilndeed the only disposition that appears inconsistent
with the various opinions is an affirmance." Id. Adams was correct in his proposition
that although the court should be concerned with providing guidance for the lower
courts, it is not irresponsible or uncommon for a remand to be based on a variety of
grounds. See id.
Moreover, the procedural posture of the case does not preclude an otherwise
appropriate remedy, as Chief Judge Seitz argued. See 712 F.2d at 845-46 (Seitz, C.J.,
concurring). As Judge Adams noted, if the case was remanded, and Mollica chose to
testify, his testimony would possibly demonstrate that hi had not violated the condi-
tions of his probation. See 712 F.2d at 854 (Adams, J., Statement Sur Petition For
Rehearing). Despite the fact that nine judges would have remanded for some reason,
Mollica faces a five year prison term. A remand to the district court would enable
Mollica to testify, but would not overburden the district court.
In addition, a remand would not be inappropriate although there is no single
basis for such a decision. As Judge Adams also noted, the Supreme Court itself has
adopted such an approach. See 712 F.2d at 854 (Adams, J., Statement Sur Petition
For Rehearing).
131. For a discussion of the court's holding on the exclusionary rule issue, see
notes 71-87 and accompanying text supra.
132. See 712 F.2d at 845-46 (Seitz, C.J., concurring) ("The district court's error
clearly is inconsistent with a sound exercise of discretion, and would call for a remand
were it not for the procedural posture of this case.").
133. The Third Circuit may consider adopting a supervisory rule granting use
immunity to prison disciplinary proceedings. Due process safeguards in prison disci-
1983-84]
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plinary proceedings are even more rudimentary than those in probation revocation
hearings. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559-72 (1974); People v. Coleman, 13
Cal. 3d at 844 n.16, 533 P.2d at 1038 n.16, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 398 n.16. It will also be
interesting to note the Third Circuit's response to a parolee's claim similar to Mol-
lica's. The interests of a parolee at a revocation hearing are identical to those of a
probationer. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (Parole and probation
revocation hearings are equivalent in terms of the requirements of due process). For
an explanation of the due process requirements of probation and parole, see notes 27-
38 and accompanying text supra.
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